(Image source from: News24online.com)

Even though the Court of Arbitration in The Hague is continuing with new hearings and requests for documents under the Indus Waters Treaty, India has made it clear that it rejects the validity of these proceedings and will not take part. The latest issue involves a directive issued last week by the Court of Arbitration that requires "pondage logbooks" from Indian hydroelectric power stations to be presented as part of what they refer to as the "Second Phase on the Merits. " The Court has scheduled hearings for February 2-3 at the Peace Palace in The Hague and has pointed out that India has not submitted any counter-memorial or shown any intention to participate. However, for New Delhi, this whole process is irrelevant. Government sources mentioned that the "so-called illegally formed" Court of Arbitration is continuing to "conduct parallel proceedings besides the neutral expert. " Since India does not recognize the authority of the Court, it does not engage with any of its communications. Moreover, since the Indus Waters Treaty is currently on hold, India is not obligated to respond. This is seen as a strategy by Pakistan to involve us to demonstrate that we are still engaged.

The reason behind this unusual deadlock dates back to April 23, 2025, a day after 26 civilians in Pahalgam were killed by terrorists linked to Pakistan. India officially placed the Indus Waters Treaty "on hold" and for the first time since 1960, made a clear connection between water cooperation and Pakistan's ongoing use of terrorism as part of its state policy. This decision was made alongside Operation Sindoor and represented a significant change in India’s approach to Pakistan – cooperation cannot continue in the face of hostility. Pakistan's response has been intense. Over the past nine months, Pakistan has called in ambassadors, sent delegations to various world capitals, contacted the United Nations, launched over ten legal actions, and organized several international conferences – all focused on the idea that India has targeted its most vulnerable point. Approximately 80-90 percent of Pakistan's farming depends on the Indus River system. Its water storage is barely enough to last a month. Major reservoirs like Tarbela and Mangla are reportedly close to empty. What was once just a technical treaty has now turned into a source of strategic pressure.

Despite India's stance, the court located in The Hague is acting as if the treaty is still fully in effect. In an order dated January 24, 2026, the court detailed a hearing plan for February 2-3, stating that if India does not show up, only Pakistan will present its arguments in person at the Peace Palace. Five days later, in another order, the court, on Pakistan's request, asked India to produce internal operational logbooks from the Baglihar and Kishanganga hydroelectric plants to examine whether India has historically "inflated" its pondage calculations. It also warned that if India does not comply, it may draw "adverse inferences" or ask Pakistan to submit the same documents obtained through neutral expert proceedings. The court explicitly stated that India's position on putting the treaty in abeyance "does not limit the competence of the court." This is precisely the position India rejects.

Under the IWT dispute mechanism, technical differences go to a neutral expert, while legal disputes go to a Court of Arbitration. India has consistently maintained that the current issues fall within the neutral expert's domain and that Pakistan's move to activate the Court amounts to "forum shopping." New Delhi's refusal to engage with the CoA is rooted in this interpretation. By continuing to recognise only the neutral expert process, India is signalling that it will not allow Pakistan to expand the dispute into a broader legal and political theatre. The court's latest orders show that it is trying to bridge information between the two parallel processes, something India sees as illegitimate. What is unfolding in The Hague is not merely a legal dispute over hydroelectric calculations. It is the first real test of India's decision to weaponise the treaty framework diplomatically after decades of restraint. For Pakistan, internationalising the issue is a survival imperative. For India, disengaging is a strategic choice.

The CoA may continue to issue orders, fix hearings and pass procedural directions. But without India's participation and with the treaty officially in abeyance, the proceedings risk becoming a one-sided legal record rather than a binding adjudication. In South Block's view, that is precisely the point. India's message since Pahalgam has been consistent: treaties cannot function in isolation from ground realities. And until Pakistan addresses what New Delhi calls "abnormal hostility," even the world's most cited water-sharing agreement will remain suspended in more ways than one.